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1 
DEFINING ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR THE 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: A CASE FOR THE 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCTRINE IN 
WASHINGTON 
Benjamin J. Robbins 
Abstract: Corporations increasingly rely on independent contractors to fulfill basic 
organizational needs. This increased reliance has created a number of legal issues, one of 
which is the level of privilege extended to communications between contractors and legal 
counsel for the contracting corporation. This issue is particularly relevant for corporations in 
the “gig economy,” like Uber, Lyft, and Postmates, which rely on independent contractors 
for fundamental business functions. Washington State courts have yet to decide whether 
independent contractors are entitled to attorney-client privilege regarding these 
conversations. Generally, Washington courts follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s “Upjohn 
rule,” which protects communications between corporate counsel and non-executive 
employees in certain, somewhat vague situations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit and Colorado Supreme Court have adopted a practical legal test to address this issue, 
entitling a corporation’s independent contractors to privilege with the corporation’s counsel 
if they are “functionally equivalent to” or “indistinguishable from” the corporation’s 
employees. This Comment argues that Washington State courts should adopt the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s extension of the functional equivalent doctrine. Colorado’s approach 
reflects the fluid state of twenty-first century employment relationships, which increasingly 
deviate from the traditional employer-employee model. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to an estimate by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, independent contractors make up more than forty percent of the 
American workforce.1 This is in part due to the dynamic nature of 
modern industry and evolving working relationships, but it is also 
financially motivated. Employers, recognizing that traditional employees 
receive significant legal protections and tax benefits not afforded to 
independent contractors,2 are increasingly misclassifying employees as 
                                                      
 I would like to thank the student editors of the Washington Law Review Online for their 
flexibility, thoughtfulness, and tireless efforts. 
1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, 
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 4 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
C4TT-NVN3] (“Applying this broad definition to our analysis of data from the General Social 
Survey (GSS), we estimate that such contingent workers comprised 35.3 percent of employed 
workers in 2006 and 40.4 percent in 2010.”). 
2. See id. at 21–24. 
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independent contractors to skirt the payroll tax and avoid providing other 
legal and financial benefits to their workforce.3 
In the realm of employment law, the blurring line between employees 
and independent contractors has made it difficult for courts and 
legislators to make a legal distinction between the two. While seemingly 
trivial in practice, the legal distinction can have broad consequences, 
especially in the context of litigation. Whether a court considers a 
worker an employee or a contractor has serious implications for that 
worker’s liability exposure and right to labor protections, which are 
traditionally extended only to employees. Moreover, it affects the 
applicability of attorney-client privilege. Traditionally, only employees 
are covered by attorney-client privilege when communicating with their 
employer’s attorneys, while independent contractors are not.4 This 
Comment examines that tradition and identifies a growing consensus for 
change in courts around the country. This Comment proposes that 
Washington courts adopt a workable solution. 
Part I of this Comment explores the history of the 
employee/contractor divide, including its evolution from medieval 
England to modern workplace relationships. Part II discusses the current 
state of the law surrounding attorney-client privilege, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s “Upjohn rule.” Part III traces the rise of the “functional 
equivalent” doctrine, from the creation of the Eighth Circuit’s five-part 
test in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith5 to its application to 
independent contractors in In Re Bieter Co.,6 and the Colorado Supreme 
Court’s refinement of the test in Alliance Construction Solutions Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Corrections.7 Part IV provides an overview of current 
Washington law on attorney-client privilege and argues that Washington 
courts should adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s extension of the 
Bieter rule, protecting communications between attorneys and 
independent contractors when: (a) the contractors have a “significant 
relationship” not only to the corporate entity but also to the matter that is 
the subject of the entity’s need for legal services; (b) the communication 
                                                      
3. Robert Moskowitz, IRS Cracking Down on Misclassified Employees, INTUIT QUICKBOOKS, 
https://quickbooks.intuit.com/r/employees/irs-cracking-down-on-misclassified-employees/[https:// 
perma.cc/AM3S-AYYH]. 
4. See, e.g., Shere v. Marshall Field & Co., 327 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ill. 1974) (“Safety and Claims 
Service is an independent contractor retained by both the defendant and by defendant’s excess 
public liability insurer to investigate and adjust claims. . . . The attorney-client privilege has never 
been extended to cover communications to such third parties.” (emphasis added)). 
5. 572 F.2d 596, 601–02 (8th Cir. 1978). 
6. 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994). 
7. 54 P.3d 861, 868 (Colo. 2002). 
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was made for the purpose of seeking legal “assistance”; (c) the subject 
matter of the communication was within the scope of the independent 
contractors’ duties; and (d) the communication was treated as 
confidential and only disseminated to those persons with a specific need 
to know its contents. In doing so, Washington courts can simultaneously 
settle this area of law and accomplish a number of desirable policy 
goals. 
I. HISTORY OF THE LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS 
A. The Employee/Contractor Distinction Has Roots in Fourteenth 
Century England 
Since the genesis of wage labor, which began to appear in fourteenth- 
and fifteenth-century England,8 courts have struggled to define the exact 
bounds of the employer-employee relationship. The Statute of Laborers,9 
enacted in 1351 in response to a widespread labor shortage, was one of 
the earliest attempts to delineate between “hired servants”10 and those 
working under contract.11 
The distinction outlined in the Statute largely concerned the rights and 
obligations of hired servants and independent contractors in relation to 
their employers. A servant who “depart[ed] from . . . service before the 
end of the term agreed, without permission or reasonable cause” would 
face “the penalty of imprisonment.”12 Independent contractors (referred 
to in the Statute as tradesmen and “other artisans and labourers”) 
meanwhile faced no such penalty.13 Similarly, a servant’s master was 
permitted to “use force to capture a servant who departed, or who, 
having been retained, never entered his service.”14 The Statute did not 
                                                      
8. MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 4 (1989).  
9.  The Statute of Laborers 1315, YALE L. SCH.: AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu 
/medieval/statlab.asp [http://perma.cc/C8NV-KA6F]. 
10. The term “hired servant” is commonly used in historical sources to refer to the traditional 
employer-employee relationship. JOHN OGILVIE, THE IMPERIAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE: A COMPLETE ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON, LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
924 (1851); Bruce P. Smith, Imperial Borrowing: The Law of Master and Servant, 25 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 447, 450 (2004). 
11. LINDER, supra note 8, at 46.  
12. Statute of Laborers 1315, supra note 9.  
13. See id. 
14. LINDER, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
462–63 (4th ed. 1936)). 
Document1 (Do Not Delete) 12/31/2017  6:16 PM 
4 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93:1 
 
give the same rights to one who engaged an independent contractor.15 
Additionally, a master had rights “against other masters who persuaded 
his servant to depart, or who, having unknowingly engaged his servant, 
did not give him up when required to do so.”16 One who engaged an 
independent contractor had no such rights.17 
Aside from accommodating the rise of contracted workers, the Statute 
also served as a codification of the common law.18 Indeed, conditions of 
employment and the rights and duties of the parties “showed that 
[fourteenth century legislators] intended the relationship should preserve 
some of the characteristics of a [traditional master-servant 
relationship].”19 From a more cynical perspective, the statute also 
attempted to preserve the class system—namely the ruling class’s 
dominion over unskilled workers—by giving more rights to those 
involved in skilled trades. Regardless of the motivations of its drafters, 
the Statute of Laborers signified a shift in the way the English legal 
system categorized workers. 
Moreover, the Statute represents the first in a path of legislation and 
case law that treated hired servants and independent contractors 
differently. This path eventually culminated in the passage of the 
Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 and the Truck Amendment Act of 
1887.20 These two Acts granted certain rights to a “workman,” defined 
as: 
[A]ny person who, being a labourer, servant in husbandry, 
journeyman, artificer, handicraftsman, miner, or otherwise 
engaged in manual labor, . . . has entered into or works under a 
contract with an employer, whether the contract . . . be a contract 
of service or a contract personally to execute any work or 
labour.21 
                                                      
15. See Statute of Laborers 1315, supra note 9.  
16. LINDER, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
462–63 (4th ed. 1936)). 
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., id. (“The legislators of the fourteenth century aimed at obtaining the same results as 
those attained by the old customs and by-laws. These old customs and by-laws treated the 
relationship of master and servant as a status, and regulated it accordingly. The legislators of the 
fourteenth century recognized that the relationship had then come to be created by contract.” 
(quoting 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 461 (4th ed. 1936))). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 105. 
21. Id. (quoting 38 & 39 Vict., c. 90, § 10 (1875)). Notably, this provision excluded “domestic 
and menial servants.” Id. 
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Despite the confusing use of the term “contract” in this context, these 
statutes were expressly designed to benefit “those who hire themselves 
to labour with their hands for daily or weekly wages,”22 but not those 
who engage in a contract “not for labor but for the result of the 
labor. . . .”23 In other words, the Employers and Workmen Act and the 
Truck Act were designed to protect employees, who required “state-
enforced protection.”24 They did not protect independent contractors, 
who were considered “fledging entrepreneurs.”25 
B. The Development of the Employee/Contractor Distinction in 
America 
In America, courts applied several approaches to distinguish between 
independent contractors and employees.26 This issue most often arose in 
the context of tort claims in which a plaintiff attempted to hold a 
contractee responsible for the negligence of a contractor.27 
Initially, state courts applied traditional agency principles to 
determine whether the contractee would be held liable. For example, in 
Inhabitants of Lowell v. Boston & L.R. Corp.,28 a railroad corporation 
hired a contractor to construct a portion of a railroad across a public 
road.29 Workers hired by the contractor removed protective barriers from 
the road that prevented travelers from falling into a ditch that had been 
cut into the road, in which the railroad would be placed.30 At night, the 
plaintiffs drove a carriage into the ditch and were injured.31 At trial, the 
jury found for the plaintiffs and held the railroad liable for their 
injuries.32 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the 
                                                      
22. Id. at 106. 
23. Id. at 108. 
24. Id. at 105–06. 
25. Id. at 106. 
26. See, e.g., Hoatz v. Patterson, 5 Watts & Serg. 537, 538 (Pa. 1843) (contractor who furnished 
“nothing but his superintendence and skill as an undertaker” could not recover statutory 
construction lien). 
27. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Lowell v. Boston & L.R. Corp., 40 Mass. (1 Pick.) 24, 24 (1839) 
(plaintiff who rode carriage into ditch across a road attempted to hold a railroad company liable for 
negligence of a contractor and his hired workers); Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121, 129–30 (1852) 
(plaintiff who fell into sewer trench attempted to hold city liable for negligence of contractor). 
28. 40 Mass. (1 Pick.) 24 (1839).  
29. Id. at 24. 
30. Id. at 29. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 25. 
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railroad’s liability turned on whether the workmen were deemed to be 
“servants or agents” of the railroad.33 If they were, the railroad would be 
held liable; if they were not—and instead were recognized as employees 
of the independent contractor—the railroad would not be liable.34 
Ultimately, the court held that the workers, although they were 
employees of an independent contractor, were the “servants” of the 
railroad because their work was done for the railroad’s benefit, “under 
[its] authority, and by [its] direction.”35 In essence, the contracted 
workers were stepping into the shoes of employment— serving as the 
functional equivalent of an employee. As a result, the railroad was held 
liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries.36 
More than a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to adopt a 
different approach when it first addressed the distinction between 
employees and independent contractors in Winder v. Caldwell.37 In 
Winder, the plaintiff, Caldwell, sued Winder to compel payment for 
construction work Caldwell had completed in the District of Columbia.38 
Winder argued that the underlying federal statute only protected workers 
hired directly by a builder– not general contractors.39 The Court agreed, 
noting that the purpose of the statute was to protect those workers whose 
“personal labor” went into the building, not someone who contracts to 
do the work but then hires others to provide the labor.40 The test was 
rudimentary: protecting a worker if they contributed “personal labor” to 
a building, but not if they were a contractor who simply contracted to 
complete the work and managed others in doing so. Nonetheless, Winder 
is notable because it represents the first case in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court tried to draw the line between the traditional employer-employee 
relationship and that of a contractor-contractee. 
Finally, consider City of New York v. Bailey.41 In that case, New York 
State Water Commissioners built a municipal dam across the Croton 
River to supply the City of New York with water.42 An unprecedented 
flood caused the dam to collapse, causing damage to plaintiffs’ 
                                                      
33. Id. at 26. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 31. 
36. Id. at 35. 
37. 55 U.S. (1 How.) 434 (1852).  
38. Id. at 434. 
39. Id. at 435.  
40. Id. at 445.  
41. 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845). 
42. Id. at 436. 
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property.43 Plaintiffs sued the City of New York, alleging negligence in 
the dam’s construction and design.44 The City of New York argued, and 
ultimately the court held, that the City could not be held liable under a 
master-servant theory for any negligence surrounding the dam’s 
construction or design: 
The defendants below cannot be held responsible for any 
supposed negligence in the construction of the dam. They did 
not appoint the water commissioners or the engineers or agents 
who executed the work, and had no power to direct them as to 
the manner of doing it, or to remove them for unskillfulness or 
misconduct.45 
Ultimately, the City was held liable under a premises liability 
theory.46 But it is important to consider the court’s primary rationale on 
the master-servant issue: in attempting to determine whether the workers 
fell under the umbrella of “master-servant,” the court focused on the 
extent of control the City of New York possessed over the workers who 
designed and built the dam. Because the City exercised little control over 
the workers, the Court held that the workers were not the City’s servants, 
and thus the City could not be held liable under such a theory.47 This 
“right of control” test would prove to be the one adopted by the majority 
of jurisdictions in the country, including Washington State and the U.S. 
Supreme Court.48 
C. Modern Distinctions Between Employees and Contractors 
Today, the legal distinction between independent contractors, the self-
employed, and traditional employer-employee relationships is far from 
clear.49 Indeed, in the modern context, some question its usefulness 
                                                      
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 434. 
45. Id. at 437. 
46. Id. at 445. 
47. Id. at 442–43. 
48. See e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968) (adopting common law right 
of control test in National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) cases); Larson v. Centennial Mill Co., 40 
Wash. 224, 228, 82 P. 294, 295 (1905) (holding contractor could not be held liable for 
“independent” subcontractor’s negligence because contractor had no right of control over  
subcontractor). 
49. See, e.g., NLRB. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1944) (holding common law right 
of control test for evaluating did not apply to NLRA), superseded by statute, The National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012), as recognized in, United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 254 
n.1.  
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entirely.50 This is largely because the definition of an “independent 
contractor” is nebulous. Depending on the context, it can include 
workers employed in a variety of relationships that deviate from the 
traditional employer-employee model, including agency temp workers, 
temporary contract workers, long-term contract workers, day laborers, 
on-call workers, and the self-employed.51 Frequently, the distinction is 
nominal at best. 
The issue is further complicated by the variety of definitions and 
protections for “employees” and “contractors” found in federal law. This 
includes statutes like the National Labor Relations Act,52 the Civil 
Rights Act,53 the Fair Labor Standards Act,54 and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act.55 It also extends to federal agencies, 
which frequently struggle to define the point at which an employee 
becomes a contractor. For example, the IRS applies a twenty-factor test 
to evaluate contractor status, taking into account the control the 
employer has over the prospective employee, among other things.56 
These varying definitions can lead to confusing results, with a worker 
being considered an employee under one evaluation scheme but a 
contractor under the next.57 As a result, courts and employees are faced 
with an “unnecessarily complicated regulatory maze,” through which 
they must find their way.58 
                                                      
50. LINDER, supra note 8.  
51. Id. at 3–4. 
52. The NLRA expressly withholds its protections from “independent contractors,” but does not 
expressly define the term. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  
53. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 only contemplates protections for the “employee.” See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the Civil Rights Act does not protect independent contractors). 
54. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/comp 
liance/whdfs13.htm [http://perma.cc/8XTQ-BZLQ] (explaining FLSA protections do not apply to 
independent contractors). 
55. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992) (traditional agency law factors 
apply for identifying master-servant relationships). 
56. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO WORKER 
CLASSIFICATION FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES 3–5 (2007).  
57. Susan N. Houseman, 9.1 Who is an Employee? Determining Independent Contractor Status, 
in U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON TEMPORARY HELP, ON-CALL, DIRECT-HIRE TEMPORARY, 
LEASED, CONTRACT COMPANY, AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1999), http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/futurework/conference 
/staffing/9.1_contractors.htm [http://perma.cc/4EZY-NC4E]. 
58. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, V. CONTINGENT WORKERS, http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/ 
dunlop/section5.htm [http://perma.cc/K4AY-9B2Y]. 
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In Washington State, courts generally employ the traditional common 
law “right of control test”59 to evaluate whether an individual is an 
employee or an independent contractor.60 Washington Practice defines a 
“servant” as “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of 
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance 
of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”61 In 
short, “the difference between an independent contractor and an 
employee is whether the employee can tell the worker how to do his or 
her job.”62 
II. THE LAW OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
One of the legal protections generally possessed by corporate 
employees—but not independent contractors—is attorney-client 
privilege with the corporation’s in-house attorneys. Generally, attorney-
client privilege refers to a “client’s right to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing confidential communications between the 
client and the attorney.”63 The privilege is one of the oldest rights found 
in Anglo-American law,64 and it is of such importance that it survives 
even the client’s death.65 The attorney cannot waive the privilege—that 
right belongs only to the client. 
                                                      
59. See supra section I.B. 
60. To evaluate the level of control exercised over a worker, Washington courts consider a 
number of factors, including:  
(a) [T]he extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of 
the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required 
in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of 
time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by 
the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) 
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) 
whether the principal is or is not in business.  
DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, 16 WASH. PRAC., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:3 (4th 
ed. 2017). 
61. Id. at § 220(1) (emphasis added). 
62. Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wash. 2d 114, 119, 52 P.3d 472, 474 (2002). 
63. Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
64. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney–client privilege is 
the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”) (citing 8 
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).  
65. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 399 (1998) (“[I]t has been 
overwhelmingly, if not universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the privilege survives the 
client’s death . . . .”). 
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The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients”66 because both 
the quality of the attorney’s legal advice and the public good are served 
by attorneys being fully informed by their clients.67 Assuring clients that 
incriminating statements made to their attorneys will not be used against 
them encourages clients to “make full disclosure to their attorneys.”68 In 
the corporate context, the privilege shields qualifying communications 
between the employee and corporate counsel from disclosure to third-
parties or at trial.69 It is of critical importance when litigation occurs. 
Generally, corporations enjoy fewer rights than individuals.70 That 
said, it is generally well-recognized that corporations, despite being 
“artificial creature[s] of the law,” are entitled to attorney-client privilege 
in certain circumstances.71 Indeed, given that corporations are legal 
entities made up of people, it follows that those people should enjoy 
attorney-client privilege with the corporation’s attorneys when they 
discuss corporate business. 
At first, corporate attorney-client privilege only extended to those 
employees in the “control group” of the corporation.72 Employees were 
considered to be in the “control group” if, while contacting the lawyer 
for legal advice, they were “in a position to control or even to take a 
substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may 
take upon the advice of the attorney.”73 In that case, privilege would 
apply because they “[are] (or personif[y]) the corporation when [they] 
                                                      
66. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
67. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in 
the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and 
skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the 
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”). 
68. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470. 
69. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.  
70. See, e.g., Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 155 (1923) (holding 
corporations do not enjoy Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
71. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90; see also United States v. Louisville & N.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 
(1915) (protecting corporate records from disclosure under attorney-client privilege); Radiant 
Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963) (overturning trial court’s denial 
of attorney-client privilege to corporation); id. at 319 n.7 (collecting cases). However, the 
occasional court has held that only “natural persons” are protected by the privilege. See, e.g., 
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1962), adhered to, 209 F. 
Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), and rev’d, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding attorney-client 
privilege only attaches to “natural persons,” not corporations).  
72. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
73. Id. 
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make[] [their] disclosure to the lawyer.”74 The legal theory prevailed for 
nearly two decades. 
A. The Demise of the “Control Group” Test in Upjohn 
In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the governing case for 
corporate attorney-client privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States.75 
Upjohn involved a pharmaceutical company, Upjohn, whose general 
counsel sent a questionnaire to “all foreign managers seeking detailed 
information” about certain questionable payments that had been made to 
foreign governments “to secure government business.”76 The general 
counsel then conducted detailed interviews with the foreign managers. 
Later, the IRS discovered the payments and demanded the company 
produce the questionnaires and the notes from the interviews.77 Upjohn’s 
general counsel refused to produce the documents, claiming they were 
both protected by attorney-client privilege and also work product in 
preparation for litigation.78 The IRS subsequently filed suit, and the 
district court ordered Upjohn to produce the documents.79 The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying the “control group test,” held 
attorney-client privilege did not apply to “[t]o the extent that the 
communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for 
directing [petitioner’s] actions in response to legal advice . . . for the 
simple reason that the communications were not the ‘client’s.’”80 
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the court of appeals, holding 
that the communications between the company’s general counsel and its 
employees were protected by attorney-client privilege.81 It reasoned that 
the “control group” test was a flawed method of analysis for a number of 
reasons. First, the Court noted that the test “discourag[es] the 
communication of relevant information by employees of the client to 
attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”82 “The 
control group test overlooks the fact that such privilege exists to protect 
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but 
                                                      
74. Id. 
75. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
76. Id. at 383. 
77. Id. 
78. Id.  
79. Id. 
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979)). 
81. Id. at 383–84.  
82. Id. at 392. 
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also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound 
and informed advice.”83 To that end, the Court noted that while 
corporate decisions are typically made by high-level executives, it is 
often lower-level employees who possess information relevant to 
corporate liability: 
While in the case of the individual client the provider of 
information and the person who acts on the lawyer’s advice are 
one and the same, in the corporate context it will frequently be 
employees beyond the control group . . . who will possess the 
information needed by the corporation’s lawyers. Middle-level–
and indeed lower-level–employees can, by actions within the 
scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious 
legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees 
would have the relevant information needed by corporate 
counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to 
such actual or potential difficulties.84 
Second, the Court found that the “control group” test also makes it 
more difficult for low-level employees to enact corporate policy as 
advised by corporate counsel because the advice given by counsel is not 
“full and frank,” as it would be if protected by privilege.85 Third, the test, 
as applied, often had unpredictable results, largely because determining 
which corporate executives are in the “control group” is an inherently 
subjective inquiry.86 Lastly, by leaving unprotected conversations by 
employees not in the control group, the test may make it more likely for 
corporations and their employees to inadvertently violate the law: 
In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory 
legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, 
unlike most individuals, “constantly go to lawyers to find out 
how to obey the law,” . . . particularly since compliance with the 
law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter, see, e. g., United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–441 
                                                      
83. Id. at 384.  
84. Id. at 390–91.  
85. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 
1164 (D.S.C. 1974) (“After the lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the 
Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corporate personnel who will apply 
it.”). 
86. Compare Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315–16 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (control group includes 
assistant managers and members of corporate patent committee), with Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. 
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83–85 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (a “control group includes only division and 
corporate vice presidents, and not two directors of research and vice president for production and 
research”). Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. 
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(1978) (“the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often 
difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable 
and economically justifiable business conduct”).87 
In Upjohn’s case, the Court explained that the communications were 
made (1) by Upjohn employees to counsel acting within the scope of 
their employment, (2) at the direction of corporate superiors, and (3) for 
the purpose of seeking legal advice.88 The questionnaire was clearly 
addressed from Upjohn’s General Counsel, and a memo accompanying 
the questionnaire clearly gave legal advice to the managers receiving the 
questionnaire.89 Because these communications were “[c]onsistent with 
the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, these 
communications must be protected against compelled disclosure.”90 
Besides these three factors, the Court gave no guidance as to what 
other types of corporate communications are privileged.91 As is often the 
case, it was up to the lower courts to draw the lines. 
III. THE RISE OF THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCTRINE 
While the various Circuit Courts attempted to resolve the post-Upjohn 
ambiguity in a variety of ways,92 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
provided the clearest and most concrete test for applying attorney-client 
privilege to communications from independent contractors. As a starting 
                                                      
87. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392–93 (citations omitted). 
88. Id. at 394.  
89. Id. at 395 (stating that “Upjohn will comply with all laws and regulations” and that payments 
“will not be used as a subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments” and that all payments must be 
“proper and legal”). 
90. Id. Although the court of appeals was concerned that extending attorney-client privilege 
beyond the control-group test would complicate discovery and create a “broad ‘zone of silence’ 
over corporate affairs,” id., the Supreme Court dismissed its concerns:  
Application of the attorney–client privilege to communications such as those involved here, 
however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never taken 
place. The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure 
of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.  
Id. 
91. In fact, it expressly “decline[d] to lay down a broad rule . . . to govern all conceivable future 
questions [of corporate attorney-client privilege].” Id. at 386. 
92. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Thus, following 
Upjohn’s lead in not applying the privilege mechanically does not counsel in favor of applying the 
privilege anytime it might increase the flow of information; rather, Upjohn counsels a more nuanced 
inquiry into whether according a type of communication protection is likely to encourage 
compliance-enhancing communication that makes our system for resolving disputes more 
operable.”); In re John Doe Corp. 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The Upjohn privilege is 
clearly limited to communications made to attorneys solely for the purpose of the corporation 
seeking legal advice and its counsel rendering it.”).  
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point, the court adopted a basic legal framework for determining which 
communications from a traditional employee to corporate counsel are 
privileged.93 Under the so-called “Diversified test,” a communication 
between an employee and an employer’s legal counsel is privileged if it 
satisfies five elements: 
(1) [T]he communication was made for the purpose of securing 
legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so 
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made 
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) 
the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of 
the employee’s corporate duties; (5) and the communication is 
not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the 
corporate structure, need to know its contents.94 
While this test primarily provided much-needed clarity to employee 
communications in the wake of Upjohn, it also laid a solid foundation 
upon which the Eight Circuit has successfully built a doctrine governing 
the application of attorney-client privilege to independent contractors. 
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Adoption of the Functional Equivalent 
Doctrine in Bieter 
In addition to adopting a concrete analytical framework to evaluate 
attorney-employee privilege, the Eighth Circuit has also established 
precedent under which independent contractors, in certain cases, can be 
entitled to attorney-client privilege.95 Under the aptly-named “functional 
equivalent” doctrine, the court found that communications with an 
independent contractor are protected by privilege if that contractor is 
“indistinguishable from” or the “functional equivalent” of an 
employee.96 
The Eight Circuit first adopted this stance in In re Bieter Co.97 In that 
case, Bieter Co. was a partnership formed by two businessmen to 
develop a parcel of farm land in Eagan, Minnesota.98 Citing a “lack of 
cooperation from local government” and difficulties with competing 
                                                      
93. The court adopted a modified version of the Seventh Circuit’s “Harper & Row” test. See 
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). 
94. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 609. 
95. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994).  
96. Id. at 938. 
97. Id. at 935. 
98. Id. at 930. 
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developers, Bieter Co. sued the developers in federal court.99 Bieter Co. 
alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act.100 
As part of discovery, the defendant developers requested 
communications and documents between Bieter Co. and its counsel.101 
Bieter Co. argued these documents were protected by attorney-client 
privilege.102 The developers brought a motion to compel discovery and a 
magistrate judge ruled the material in question was not protected 
because it had been disclosed to an independent contractor who had 
worked closely with Bieter Co. in its development attempts.103 Bieter 
Co. appealed, petitioning the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus 
against the district court.104 
The contractor, Dennis Klohs, had assisted Bieter Co. throughout the 
entire attempted acquisition.105 He and one of Bieter Co.’s business 
partners worked out of an office together and, although Klohs’s retention 
agreement clearly stated he was to be an independent contractor, he was 
“intimate[ly] involve[d]” with the attempts to develop the parcel.106 He 
worked with “architects, consultants, and counsel,” appeared at public 
hearings before the municipal council and planning commission, and 
spoke with the media regarding the proposed development.107 All 
viewed him as a representative of Bieter Co.108 His contributions were so 
vital to the company he was hired as an employee after four years of 
contracting with Bieter Co.109 
In its opinion, the Bieter Court cited an article written by John Sexton 
discussing the status of post-Upjohn corporate attorney-client 
privilege.110 Sexton’s article hypothesizes that “at times there will be 
potential information-givers who are not employees of the corporation 
but who are nonetheless meaningfully associated with the corporation in 
                                                      
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 931.  
102. Id.  
103. Id.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 933.  
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 934. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 936; John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982). 
Document1 (Do Not Delete) 12/31/2017  6:16 PM 
16 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93:1 
 
a way that makes it appropriate to consider them ‘insiders’ for the 
purposes of the privilege.”111 He encourages the reader to consider a 
contracted in-house accountant at a corporation currently undergoing an 
IRS audit and subsequent tax indictment issues: 
As the accountant, he has an insider’s knowledge of the 
corporation’s operations that few people even on the 
corporation’s payroll have . . . . Clearly, the accountant has 
knowledge of extraordinary importance to the attorney’s 
investigation of the tax matter. And, equally clearly, the logic of 
Upjohn commands that the mere fact that the accountant was not 
an employee of the corporation should not preclude application 
of the privilege. There is no reason to differentiate between an 
accountant-employee and a regularly retained outside accountant 
when both occupy the same extremely sensitive and continuing 
position as financial adviser, reviewer, and agent: both possess 
information of equal importance to the lawyer.112 
Sexton also noted that “a literalistic extension of the privilege only to 
persons on the corporation’s payroll would invariably prevent a 
corporation’s attorney from engaging in a confidential discussion with a 
corporation’s regular independent accountant, no matter how important 
the accountant’s information would be to the attorney.”113 
The Bieter Court agreed with Sexton’s logic and said it would be 
“inappropriate to distinguish between” those on payroll and those 
employed as independent contractors.114 Such a distinction would 
interfere with corporate counsel’s ability to confer confidentially with 
independent contractors that may “possess the very sort of information 
that the privilege envisions flowing most freely.”115 As a result, 
contractors who possess a “significant relationship” with the client and 
the client’s “involvement in the transaction” should be protected by the 
privilege.116 Klohs was involved on a daily basis with Bieter Co., and he 
interacted externally on its behalf.117 The Eighth Circuit said there was 
“no principled basis to distinguish [his] role from that of an employee” 
and that his involvement in development, the subject of the litigation, 
made him “precisely the sort of person with whom a lawyer would wish 
                                                      
111. Sexton, supra note 110, at 498. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 937. 
115. Id. at 938. 
116. Id. at 937; Sexton, supra note 110, at 498. 
117. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938. 
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to confer confidentially.”118 For these reasons, the Court held that Klohs 
was functionally the equivalent of an employee at Bieter Co. and 
therefore had the same rights as an employee to attorney-client 
privilege.119 The Eighth Circuit went on to apply its Diversified test to 
Klohs, ultimately finding that his communications with Bieter Co.’s 
attorney were privileged.120 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Adoption of the Functional Equivalent 
Doctrine in Graf 
Recently, in United States v. Graf,121 the Ninth Circuit expressly 
adopted the Eighth Circuit’s “functional equivalent” doctrine.122 In that 
case, the defendant, James Graf, operated an insurance brokerage, 
Employers Mutual, as an independent contractor.123 He did so to avoid 
California’s banning of Graf from insurance work as a punishment for 
previous misconduct.124 The lawsuit initially arose because Employers 
Mutual refused to pay out over $20 million in medical claims, instead 
funneling customer premiums to a shell corporation in Colombia.125 Graf 
used the money from Employers Mutual to purchase jewelry, a sports 
car, and a house.126 This conduct caught the eye of the Department of 
Labor (DOL), which began investigating the company. Graf obstructed 
the DOL investigation by knowingly providing false documents and 
information to investigators in an effort to impede the investigation.127 
After discovering his duplicity, the DOL filed a civil suit in the District 
of Nevada, seeking to remove Graf from the company, to install an 
independent fiduciary to operate the company, and to freeze Graf’s 
assets.128 
                                                      
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. For a discussion of other approaches to the independent contractor privilege problem, see 
Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for 
Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727 (2009).  
121. 610 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010). 
122. Id. at 1158. 
123. Id. at 1153. 
124. Id.  
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A few years after the civil suit was filed, Graf was indicted for his 
role in the Employers Mutual fraud.129 In spite of his status as an 
independent contractor, “[e]vidence at trial nonetheless showed Graf 
was heavily involved in all facets of the corporation’s operations.”130 
Mr. Graf regularly communicated with insurance brokers and others on 
Employers Mutual’s behalf, marketed the company’s insurance plans, 
managed its employees, and was the company’s primary agent in its 
communications with counsel.131 At his criminal trial, the government 
introduced testimony from Employers Mutual’s general counsel, which 
on appeal, Graf argued was privileged.132 
In an opinion drafted by Judge Richard Tallman, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the Bieter test, noting that several district courts in the Ninth 
Circuit had already applied Bieter’s analysis to independent contractor 
privilege scenarios and had found its reasoning persuasive.133 The court 
also noted it had previously said in dicta that “[a]s fictitious entities, 
corporations can seek and receive legal advice and communicate with 
counsel only through individuals empowered to act on behalf of the 
corporation.”134 Regardless of his purported status as an independent 
contractor, Mr. Graf was empowered to act on behalf of the corporation. 
The court indicated the above facts illustrated that in essence, his role 
was that of a “functional employee.” Accordingly, his communications 
with Employers Mutual’s general counsel that corresponded to that role 
were entitled to attorney-client privilege.135 
                                                      
129. Id.  
130. Id. at 1153. 
131. Id. at 1157. 
132. Id. at 1152. 
133. Id. at 1158; see also, e.g., Kelley v. Microsoft Corp., No. C07–475 MJP, 2009 WL 168258, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2009) (considering and ultimately rejecting Microsoft’s claim that a 
consultant was the functional equivalent of an employee under Bieter); ASU Students for Life v. 
Crow, No. CV–06–1824–PHX–MHM, 2007 WL 2725252, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2007) (adopting 
Bieter and applying it to extend attorney-client privilege to communications between attorneys and 
all members of student groups that were “directly involved” in the relevant project); Memry Corp. 
v. Ky. Oil Tech., N.V., No. C04–03843 RMW (HRL), 2007 WL 39373, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan.4, 
2007) (adopting Bieter and finding that communications between an advisor/agent to the company 
and corporate counsel were covered by the company’s attorney-client privilege); Residential 
Constructors, LLC v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:05–cv–01318–BES–GWF, 2006 WL 
3149362, at *12–16 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2006) (applying Bieter test to find attorney-client privilege 
protected communications between insurer and independent insurance adjuster). 
134. Graf, 610 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz., 881 
F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
135. Id. at 1159. 
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C. The Colorado Supreme Court’s Extension of the Functional 
Equivalent Doctrine in Alliance Construction 
Few other courts have addressed when, if ever, independent 
contractors should be entitled to attorney-client privilege with their 
contracting corporation’s attorneys. When faced with the issue, the 
Colorado Supreme Court adopted a broader iteration of Bieter’s 
“functional equivalent” doctrine.136 In Alliance Construction, Alliance 
Construction Solutions made discovery requests for communications 
made between an attorney for the Colorado Department of Corrections 
(DOC) and an employee of a DOC contractor.137 On appeal, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that the communications in question were 
protected by attorney-client privilege.138 In doing so, the Court relied 
heavily on the reasoning of Bieter and adopted a similar, but not 
identical, test to determine whether communications between corporate 
counsel and an independent contractor are protected by attorney-client 
privilege. 
First, the party seeking to protect the communications between an 
independent contractor and corporate counsel must show the contractor 
had a “significant relationship” not only to the corporate entity but also 
to the matter that is the subject of the entity’s need for legal services.139 
The relationship between the contractor and the corporate entity should 
be “closely analyzed” to determine this part of the test.140 Second, the 
party must demonstrate the communication was made for the purpose of 
seeking legal “assistance.”141 Third, the party must show the subject 
matter of the communication was within the scope of the independent 
contractors’ duties.142 Finally, the party must show the communication 
was treated as confidential and only disseminated to those persons with a 
specific need to know its contents.143 
Although the Alliance Construction test has gone relatively unnoticed 
compared to the Bieter test, it provides a broader, more flexible tool for 
courts to determine whether a communication between an independent 
contractor and corporate counsel is protected by attorney-client 
                                                      
136. See All. Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 P.3d 861 (Colo. 2002). 
137. Id. at 862. 
138. Id. at 871.  
139. Id. at 862–63.  
140. Id. at 869. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 870. 
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privilege. Specifically, while the Bieter test applies the standard 
established in Diversified144—that the communication in question is 
made for the purpose of seeking legal “advice” from an attorney—the 
Alliance Construction Court preferred the term “assistance,” believing 
that “advice” could be interpreted too narrowly.145 Additionally, the 
Colorado Supreme Court combined two elements of Bieter—that a party 
made the communication at the direction of a supervisor and that the 
supervisor requested legal advice—into a broader factor, that the subject 
matter of the communication was within the contractor’s scope of 
duties.146 Again, it believed the Bieter court’s factors were too restricting 
and could potentially discourage independent contractors from 
contacting corporate counsel or would penalize contractors who were 
contacted directly by a corporate attorney.147 While Colorado’s approach 
is not as detailed, it provides courts the authority and flexibility to rule 
justly in the vast majority of cases involving independent contractors. 
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT THE COLORADO 
SUPREME COURT’S BROADER FORM OF THE 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCTRINE 
A. The Colorado Supreme Court’s Extension of the Functional 
Equivalent Doctrine Is a Logical Extension of Washington Law on 
Privilege and Independent Contractors 
Washington Revised Code (RCW) 5.60.060(2)(a) explains the general 
rule of attorney-client privilege in Washington: “[a]n attorney or 
counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be examined 
as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her 
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment.”148 The 
statute, like many vague statutory bases for attorney-client privilege, 
fails to define what constitutes a “client.”149 In accordance with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Upjohn, Washington courts have muddled 
through issues of privilege—including who or what qualifies as a 
                                                      
144. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 1994). 
145. All. Constr. Sols., 54 P.3d at 869. 
146. Id. 
147. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (delineating the general attorney-client privilege and stating that for it to apply the 
communication must be “(2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose 
of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client”). 
148. WASH. REV. CODE. § 5.60.060 (2016). 
149. See supra Part II (discussion of difficulty of defining a “client”). 
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“client”—on a case-by-case basis as they arise.150 However, they have 
yet to adopt any clarifying factors like the Eighth Circuit’s five-part 
Diversified test.151 
Accordingly, the applicability of attorney-client privilege to 
independent contractors is an issue of first impression for Washington 
courts. With the increasing reliance of Washington’s economy on 
innovative technology companies like Zillow, Expedia, Microsoft, and 
Amazon,152 it seems likely that this issue will arise sooner rather than 
later. When the issue does arise, Washington courts should adopt the 
analysis used by the Eighth Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court—
that an independent contractor who is the “functional equivalent” of an 
employee can be equally entitled to attorney-client privilege, provided 
certain conditions are met.153 
Specifically, it should adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s four-part 
test, outlined in Alliance Construction.154 To reiterate, under this 
approach, a party wishing to protect a communication must show: (a) the 
contractor had a “significant relationship” not only to the corporate 
entity but also to the matter that is the subject of the entity’s need for 
legal services; (b) “the communication was made for the purpose of 
seeking or providing legal assistance;” (c) “the subject matter of the 
communication was within the scope of the [independent contractors’] 
duties”; and (d) “the communication was treated as confidential and only 
disseminated to those persons with a specific need to know its 
contents.”155 
                                                      
150. See, e.g., Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 651, 316 P.3d 1035, 1038 (2014) 
(reasoning that Upjohn’s emphasis on the lawyer’s “investigative abilities” supports privileged 
nature of corporate counsel’s ex parte interview with plaintiff’s treating physician); Sherman v. 
State, 128 Wash. 2d 164, 190, 905 P.2d 355, 370 (1995) (citing Upjohn for the principle that 
corporate attorney-client privilege might shield certain correspondence from discovery); Wright v. 
Grp. Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 202, 691 P.2d 564, 570 (1984) (“In enunciating a flexible 
‘control group’ test, the Upjohn Court was expanding the definition of ‘clients’ so the laudable 
goals of the attorney client privilege would be applicable to a greater number of corporate 
employees.”). 
151. See supra Part III (discussion of Diversified test). 
152. Emily Parkhurst, Washington State’s $600 Billion IT Industry: Study Shows Tech Jobs Drive 
Economic Growth, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/ 
morning_call/2015/03/washington-states-600-billion-it-industry-study.html[https://perma.cc/CGA5-
TP3U]. 
153. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994); All. Const. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 
P.3d 861 (Colo. 2002). 
154. All. Const. Sols., 54 P.3d at 862–63. 
155. Id. 
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As discussed above,156 this test differs from the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach in Bieter and Diversified in two significant ways: it extends 
privilege to communications made for the purpose of acquiring legal 
“assistance” instead of legal “advice,” and it removes the requirement 
that the employee sought assistance “at the direction of a supervisor.” 
This extension of the Bieter rule is desirable because it broadens the 
class of contractors that will be protected by the doctrine and avoids 
arbitrary lines by which a party may be unprotected. For example, if a 
contractor, of her own volition, consulted with corporate counsel, that 
communication would not be protected under the Bieter rule, but it 
would be under the Colorado Supreme Court’s broader rule. 
Adopting the Colorado Supreme Court’s four-part test would 
logically extend Washington’s existing jurisprudence concerning 
attorney-client privilege and the rights of independent contractors. First, 
it would continue Washington’s general trend of extending attorney-
client privilege to individuals not in the “control group” of a corporation, 
in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court policy guidance in 
Upjohn.157 Second, it would complement the protections already 
afforded to independent contractors in the context of workers’ 
compensation. Washington courts have repeatedly held that a “worker” 
for purposes of workers’ compensation may be either an employee or an 
independent contractor: “[a] covered worker may be an employee or an 
independent contractor so long as the statutory test is met.”158 In one 
case, the Supreme Court of Washington State articulated a rationale 
strikingly similar to the author’s:  
                                                      
156. See supra section III.C (discussion of Alliance Construction). 
157. See, e.g., Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 651, 316 P.3d 1035, 1038 (2014); 
Sherman v. State, 128 Wash. 2d 164, 190, 905 P.2d 355, 370 (1995) (citing Upjohn for the principle 
that corporate attorney-client privilege might shield certain correspondence from discovery); Wright 
v. Grp. Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 202, 691 P.2d 564, 570 (1984) (“In enunciating a flexible 
‘control group’ test, the Upjohn Court was expanding the definition of ‘clients’ so the laudable 
goals of the attorney client privilege would be applicable to a greater number of corporate 
employees.”).  
158. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enter., Inc., 186 Wash. App. 518, 528 n.5, 347 P.3d 464, 
469 n.5 (2015); see also Norman v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 10 Wash. 2d 180, 184, 116 P.2d 360, 
362 (1941) (a contractor is entitled to receive worker’s compensation “if the essence of the work he 
is performing is his personal labor”); Jamison v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 65 Wash. App. 125, 130, 
827 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). Indeed, Washington has considered this the 
employee/contractor distinction as far back as 1929: “[w]e confess that the question here is a most 
difficult one. The distinction between an employee, or servant, and an independent contractor, has 
been considered by the courts in numberless cases; but no statement of the rule has yet been made 
which perfectly fits every case.” Burchett v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 146 Wash. 85, 88–89, 261 P. 
802, 803–04 (1927). 
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We conclude that the statutory provision with which we are here 
concerned was intended to protect workmen . . . in those 
situations where the work could be done on a regular employer-
employee basis but where, because of the time, place, manner of 
performance, and basis of payment, it could be urged that the 
workman was an independent contractor rather than employee. 
Prior to the 1937 enactment, the independent contractor, when 
injured, was not entitled to the protection of the workmen’s 
compensation act. . . . It was felt to be desirable, and rightly so, 
to eliminate the technical issue of whether the workman was an 
employee or an independent contractor by giving him protection 
in either situation.159 
Those who oppose Washington’s adoption of the functional 
equivalent doctrine may cite a recent case where the Washington State 
Supreme Court declined to extend attorney-client privilege to 
communications between a former employee and corporate counsel.160 
In Newman v. Highland School District,161 parents and a student-athlete 
filed a negligence suit against Highland School District after the student 
suffered a permanent brain injury at a football game.162 The parents 
sought discovery of communications between coaches and school 
district after the coaches were no longer employed by the school 
district.163 
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court held that these kind 
of post-employment communications were not protected.164 The Court 
noted the clean nature of limiting the privilege to current employees and 
seemed concerned that allowing former employee privilege would open 
the floodgates to protect far too many communications.165 
Newman is clearly distinguishable from the case of the independent 
contractor. In fact, the Alliance Construction test squares with the 
Newman Court’s concerns. The Alliance Construction test, while 
retaining the flexibility needed in these cases, provides a clean, 
predictable framework for courts to apply. Its prescriptions concerning 
the “significant relationship” between the parties and the purpose, scope, 
and subsequent treatment of the relevant communications impose clear 
                                                      
159. White v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 470, 474, 294 P.2d 650, 653 (1956). 
160. Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist., 186 Wash. 2d 769, 381 P.3d 1188 (2016). 
161. 186 Wash. 2d 769, 381 P.3d 1188 (2016). 
162. Id. at 774, 381 P.3d at 1189.  
163. Id. at 775, 381 P.3d at 1190.  
164. Id. at 780–81, 381 P.3d at 1192–93.  
165. Id. at 782, 381 P.3d at 1193. 
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limits on any potential application of the privilege. There is little risk the 
doctrine would open the floodgates to claims from former employees; it 
would only allow contractors currently serving as the functional 
equivalent of employees to enjoy the same legal protections as those 
employees.166 
B. There Are Significant Policy Reasons Supporting Washington’s 
Adoption of the Functional Equivalent Doctrine 
Setting aside the legal arguments, there are several policy reasons 
why Washington State would benefit from the adoption of the functional 
equivalent doctrine. This Comment considers three: equity, efficiency, 
and economics. 
1. Equity 
The first policy reason Washington should adopt the functional 
equivalent doctrine is equity. Black’s Law Dictionary defines equity as 
“fairness,” “impartiality,” and “evenhanded dealing.”167 Because the 
distinction between an employee and a contracted worker is relatively 
arbitrary in nature—the former receives a wage in exchange for labor, 
and so does the latter—differences in rights based on the distinction are 
fundamentally unjust and inequitable.168 This includes providing 
attorney-client privilege protections for communications made by an 
employee, but not by a contractor acting as the functional equivalent of 
an employee. 
2. Efficiency 
The second policy reason Washington should adopt the functional 
equivalent doctrine is efficiency—in other words, the ease of disposition 
for courts and administrative agencies. Adopting an approach identical 
to the Colorado Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit’s Bieter rule would 
provide Washington courts a deep and valuable source of law from other 
jurisdictions with identical rules, of which there are several. This would 
help streamline the resolution of cases as well as allow courts to observe 
and avoid the shortcomings in other states’ jurisprudence. Moreover, 
                                                      
166. See generally All. Const. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 P.3d 861 (Colo. 2002). 
167. Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”); Equity, supra note 167 (“[t]he body of principles 
constituting what is fair and right; natural law”). 
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adopting the rule would provide valuable predictability for attorneys and 
corporations utilizing independent contractors, who are currently in the 
dark as to whether communications between corporate counsel and 
contractors would be privileged.169 
3. Economics 
Lastly, Washington should adopt the functional equivalent doctrine to 
benefit the State’s economy. As discussed in detail above, labor 
relationships have drastically evolved since even Upjohn was decided. 
Independent contractors are an increasingly relevant component of the 
American workforce: recent estimates from the Government 
Accountability Office suggest that “contingent” workers comprised 
more than 40% of the workforce in 2010, up from 35.3% in 2006.170 
With the rise of companies like UberX171 and the increasing proliferation 
of contract employment, depriving attorney-client privilege to 
contractors serving as the functional equivalent of employees would no 
doubt stifle economic growth. 
CONCLUSION 
Like many facets of our modern world, labor relationships have 
grown increasingly “gray” in recent history. This ambiguity is reflected 
in the greater participation of independent contractors in the workforce, 
a trend that will likely continue. Courts have struggled to determine what 
types of protections traditionally provided to employees apply to their 
contracted equivalents. In the context of attorney-client privilege, the 
Eighth Circuit properly identified in Bieter that when a contractor is 
serving as the “functional equivalent” of a worker in a traditional 
employer-employee relationship, communications between the 
contractor and counsel for the contracting corporation should be 
protected. Several years later, the Colorado Supreme Court applied a 
broader test that extended protections to contractors acting outside of the 
relatively narrow test applied by the Eighth Circuit in Bieter. 
                                                      
169. See supra section IV.D (discussion that this is an issue of first impression for Washington 
courts). 
170. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1 (“Applying this broad definition to our 
analysis of data from the General Social Survey (GSS), we estimate that such contingent workers 
comprised 35.3 percent of employed workers in 2006 and 40.4 percent in 2010.”). 
171. See generally How Does Uber Work?, UBERESTIMATE, http://uberestimate.com/about-uber/ 
#how-it-works [https://perma.cc/6DGF-YZUG]. 
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Washington courts have yet to consider the issue of attorney-client 
privilege specifically in the context of independent contractors. 
However, there is no doubt that the issue will eventually appear in our 
State, particularly considering the increasing presence of technology 
companies. When faced with this issue, Washington courts should apply 
the four-part test conceptualized by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Alliance Construction. The test represents the cleanest and most 
protective solution to the contractor-privilege problem. Its adoption is a 
natural extension of Washington case law on privilege and would 
complement the protections already afforded to independent contractors 
in the context of worker’s compensation. Finally, adopting the test 
would advance desirable policy goals, including equity, efficiency, and 
economics. 
 
